7 million Bq of all β nuclides leaked as contaminated water in Fukushima plant — Fukushima Diary

” According to Tepco, highly contaminated water leaked from a water storage tank on 6/26/2016.

All β nuclides density is reportedly 96,000,000 Bq/m3. Cs-134/137 density is also 700,000 Bq/m3.

Tepco states the leaked volume was 72 L. Based on their announcement, at least 6,912,000 Bq of all β nuclides leaked to contain Sr-90.

Tepco says no contaminated water spread to the outside of the tank area.

The type of this tank has unwelded joint parts, which is vulnerable for leakage.

The life of these tanks was reported to be 5 years but in 2013 Tepco admitted it has no basis.

These tanks are not bearable for the contaminated water but these are still in use. ”

by Iori Mochizuki

source with French translation and TEPCO press release links

**Internal exposure concealed: The True state of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident — Yagasaki Katsuma, The Asia-Pacific Journal

Yagasaki Katsuma’s article (below) is by far the most complete, well-researched and truthful account of radiation exposure to the Japanese as a result of the Fukushima meltdowns that I have read thus far. I highly recommend that you read this entire article. – MP

” Yagasaki Katsuma, emeritus professor of Ryukyu University, has been constantly sounding the alarm about the problem of internal exposure related to nuclear weapons testing and nuclear electricity generation. Since the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP), he has drawn on his expertise to conduct field research, and to support those who evacuated to Okinawa. We asked him to reflect on the five years since the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, and to lay out the issues that lie ahead.

Heading to the blast site 12 days post-explosion

On March 17, 2011, a friend who lived in Fukushima City contacted me. “They’re reporting an onslaught of radioactivity, but we have no idea about any of that”, he said. “We need dosimeters, but there’s no way to get our hands on them.”

I ended up making my way to Fukushima along with several dosimeters for measuring radioactivity. I set up the dosimeters. Fukushima was under a petrol provision restriction, and I could not travel freely. I needed to make arrangements for an “emergency vehicle” to use. I had left Okinawa on March 24, traveled via Osaka by plane to Fukushima Airport, and entered Fukushima City by a bus that went through Kōriyama. The Japan Railways (JR) trains had stopped running. It had been 12 days since the first explosion, which had occurred at reactor No. 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). It snowed the next morning, and I saw that a torrent of radioactivity – 12 microsieverts/hour – was relentlessly falling on the living spaces of Fukushima’s citizens.

From March 25 to 31, I went to eight areas to measure radiation doses in the air, farmland and water: Fukushima City, Iwaki City, Aizu-Wakamatsu City, Kitakata City, Minami-Sōma City, Kōriyama City, Iitate Village, and Kita-Shiobara Village. I engaged in discussions with farmers and other locals about what steps they should take.

At the time, the dose readings from farmland went down by half when just the top layer of weeds and straw litter were removed; digging 3 cm deep reduced the readings by 80%. So I suggested that if people did not plant crops this year, and removed 5 cm of topsoil from their land, they could prevent future batches of crops from radioactive contamination. It was a situation in which both national and local governments were at a loss about what to do; they could not even come up with countermeasures, and were practically without policies. In the end, apart from a few enterprising farmers who followed my recommendations, most farm-owners felt compelled to plant crops, and ended up ploughing the soil to spread radiation up to 20 cm deep.

Of the 2 dosimeters I had brought with me to conduct my survey, I lent one to a farmers’ union for one year, thus doing what I could for them in terms of temporary assistance.

No Measures to Protect Residents

One of the things which stunned me was the absoluteness of the safety myth (anzen shinwa). Even though radioactive dust was falling, no one knew anything about how to protect their bodies. The local governments had not a single dosimeter among them. The evacuation manual for NPP accidents used in Fukushima City’s elementary schools was exactly the same as the evacuation manual for earthquakes.

Furthermore, all attempts to talk about demonstrations of the danger of NPPs were categorically suppressed. Herein lies the root of why no countermeasures were taken to protect residents from radioactivity. No stable iodine tablets were distributed; no SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information) data was announced, and so on.

Before the accident, I had published a book called Concealed Radiation Exposure in 2009 with Shin Nihon Shuppansha, which expounded my view that internal exposure was a hidden kind of exposure more dangerous than external exposure.

The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) and the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) have suppressed information about those sacrificed in the atomic bombings. The International Commission for Radiation Protection (ICRP) has concealed the issue of internal exposure in the context of their commitment to the cause of the United States’ nuclear strategy.1 The Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, through multiple explosions, has scattered between one hundred and several thousand more radioactive materials than the Hiroshima bomb into the environment, resulting in health damage caused by internal exposure. This would ineluctably lead the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the ICRP to cover up internal exposure and exposure casualties. In other words, I believed that they would do everything they could to cast off health damage to Fukushima residents, and support the Japanese government’s policies to abandon its own citizens. This is what drove me to rush down to Fukushima.

The Accident on Televised Programmes

For two years in 2011 and 2012, I delivered more than 120 lectures each year, and held interviews with the mass media. The mass media did courageously report on the reality and danger of internal exposure, but a distressing incident occurred in the process. This happened during my appearance, on July 2, 2011, as a guest on NHK Television’s Weekly News Insights.

The NHK flipchart that disappeared was based on this graph. 2

I had asked them to make a flipboard for me which showed data on how the rate of child cancer deaths in Japan had jumped five years after the atomic bombings of 1945 to three times their original rate (see graph). It was data which clearly demonstrated that these children were the world’s first casualties of internal exposure. The night before the show, I was handed a script and sat in a meeting discussing the show until past 10 PM. However, the next morning, when I headed to NHK, the director told me that due to time constraints, we could not follow the script we had discussed the previous night. On entering the studio, the flipboard which I had expected to be at my feet was nowhere to be seen. When I asked a nearby staff member to please bring it for me, quickly, the reply was that they could not do that. With 30 seconds to go before showtime, I had no choice but to appear on the show bereft of my data.

The following day, when I requested a written explanation of these events, NHK did not oblige me. Faced against my will with such a situation, I feel strongly that I am responsible for not being able to properly deal with it.

The Society for Connecting Lives

My deceased wife, Okimoto Yaemi, established a society called “Connecting Lives – The Society to Connect Okinawa with Disaster Sites” together with Itō Michiko, an evacuee from Fukushima, and others. They demanded that the Tokyo Electric Power Company explain compensation claims to the victims of the disaster, and even made them come to Okinawa to explain this in person to the evacuees here. It was the first time TEPCO had traveled outside of Fukushima Prefecture to hold an information session. In Okinawa, a group of plaintiffs for a lawsuit to “return our livelihoods, return our region” also came together. 3

In the midst of all her work, Okimoto always came to send me off and to pick me up from Naha Airport. Now that she is gone, I have taken up her role as the representative for the “Connecting Lives” society.

After the accident, the melted-down reactor core was too radioactive to be properly disposed of. It is clear as day from this fact alone that nuclear power generation should not be permitted. In these 5 years, there has been a regime brimming with pollution: it is manifest in things like the lack of intelligence and care on the part of the Japanese government, the utilitarianism that places profits and power above human rights, and the political concealment of the worst environmental radiation disaster in history.

******

It is now 5 years since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and we are in an abnormal state of affairs in which TEPCO and the national government are forcing people to silently accept their victimization.

Under the Atomic Energy Basic Law, the maximum annual exposure limit for the public is set at 1 millisievert. But people are being forced to accept a revised threshold that is 20 times larger, that of 20 millisieverts per year.

In Fukushima Prefecture, the cessation of compensation payments and the lifting of the evacuation order in highly contaminated regions has forced people to return, at the same time that housing support for the evacuees is also being ended. Of course, there are no measures at all in place to deal with radioactivity outside Fukushima Prefecture.

The Chernobyl NPP accident of 1986 led Ukraine (also Belarus and Russia) to establish laws that protected human rights, which stands in great contrast with the human rights situation surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident.4

Claiming Radiation Effects as Psychological

The media reports on the occasion of 3.11’s 5th anniversary contain references to the “fūhyō higai” (damage caused by rumors of radiation) that they claim is hampering the reconstruction process. Why do they not call this as it is, “radioactivity damage”? “Fūhyō higai”is a term that they use in order to replace radiation effects as psychological problems.

Under appointment of the IAEA, Shigematsu Itsuzō (now deceased), the former chairman of RERF (formerly ABCC), carried out a health survey of Chernobyl residents. He remarked in a report he made in 1990 that “there are virtually no diseases that are caused by radiation, but attention must be paid to the psychological stress that is caused by wondering whether or not one has been exposed to radiation”. The theory that “psychological stress causes illness” is a method used to conceal the radiation victimization of the nuclear age.

In Chernobyl, uncontaminated food was distributed to residents of contaminated areas. Respite trips for children are also ensured by the state. And yet, in Fukushima, there is a huge push to “support by consumption” (tabete ouen) and the administration has implemented a policy of “locally-grown and locally-consumed” in providing children’s school lunches. Japan is not attempting to avoid internal exposure as Chernobyl-affected states did; it is doing the exact opposite.

What is at the bottom of this response? Whether it is protecting residents from radiation exposure, or decommissioning of the melted reactor core, or indeed dealing with the contamination of underground water, there are numerous things that need to be addressed even by diverting the budgets of the forthcoming Tokyo Olympics. However, the Japanese government is trying to overcome all these issues with cheaper costs at the expense of people’s suffering. Underlying this is their utilitarianism – an ideology which prioritizes economics over human rights and human lives – as well as their philosophy of abandoning the people.

Following what the government is saying, one is left speechless. “If it’s under 100 becquerels, then sell it [produce]”; “If you don’t sell it you won’t be able to support yourself”; “If you talk about radioactivity you won’t be able to sell [your produce]”; “Don’t talk about radioactivity”. Media reports are controlled by the government, and people can only remain silent.

Providing safe food is the mission of agriculture. Surely there is no more cruel infraction of human rights than to force producers, against their will, to make food that might adversely affect human health by radioactive contamination. There is no solution to this injustice other than to get rid of this system that has been imposed by fiat. Although farmers’ labors have lowered the amount of radioactive contamination in their produce, tragedies will continue as long as they keep the allowable radioactivity in food up to 100 becquerels/kilogram.

Such standard stems from the thinking that economic profits comes before health. Radioactivity even in small amounts can cause harm. International Commission on Radiological Protection has it that carcinogenesis starts with DNA mutation of a single cell. Human susceptibility to radioactivity depends on individuals, and more vulnerable ones, particularly fetuses are affected first. The natural miscarriage rate of the four prefectures including Fukushima since 311 has risen by 13%.5

Consumption of one becquerel of C-137 (with biological half-life of approximately 80 days) every day will result in an internal accumulation of 140 becquerels within about 2 years. If we have to inevitably set any standard for allowable radioactivity in food, we should use the guidelines set forth in the recommendation by German Society for Radiation Protection, which is “no food with a concentration of more than 4 becquerel of the leading radionuclide Cesium-137 per kilogram shall be given to infants, children and adolescents. Grown-ups are recommended to eat no food over 8 becquerel per kilogram of the leading nuclide Cesium-137.”6

Deceitful Dosimetry

The Japanese government’s philosophy of abandoning its people starts with its refusal to trust them, in other words it views them as unintelligent citizens. Fearing that a panic would result, it did not announce SPEEDI data, nor did it distribute solid iodine tablets. It prioritized “emotional stability” over protecting residents from radiation danger. Moreover, it implemented thorough control of information.

It is not simply that residents are seen as ignorant. The government has even actively betrayed their trust. A classic example of such actions by the state is the presentation of data on the radioactive contamination levels in the environment. The government set up monitoring posts (MP) in Fukushima Prefecture and neighboring prefectures and made the readings from them into official data. Along with Yoshida Kunihiro and others from the “Safety and Reassurance Project”, in the autumn of 2011, I checked the dose measurements of the MP. We found clear evidence that the publicly available data of the MP only showed 54% of the actual level of contamination in our readings.

Comparison of Radiation Dose Readings from the Monitoring Posts and Actual Doses

X-axis: amount of radiation (microsieverts/hour

Y-axis: actual doses for residents and measurements at monitoring posts

Black dot-dash line: Actual absorbed dose received by residents

Dotted red line: Measurements at monitoring posts without decontamination

Red line: Measurements at monitoring posts with decontamination

[When laid alongside a graph of the actual recorded radiation doses taken by the authors at the monitoring posts (black line; the absorbed dose to residents), the same displayed readings taken from the same monitoring posts were 58% of that value in the case of non-decontaminated areas and 51% for decontaminated areas.]

[2011 autumn, taken with a certified scintillator counter, model HITACHI-ALOKA YCS172B]

On top of that, there was also a deliberate downplaying in government processing of the numerical data. The level of soil contamination is directly related to the amount of radiation in the air, and an objective measurement of this thus should be obtained from the air dose. However, on the assumption that there is a uniform exposure dose to the whole body, this reading was converted to 60% of its full amount based on the projected dose, an amount called the “effective dose”, a number that divides the exposure dose among the body’s various organs. Furthermore, they made a hypothetical estimate of the time people spent inside and outside their homes, and created a “substantive dose” reading that was another 60% lower. In the background to these machinations lies the will of the international nuclear energy industry.

The health survey being conducted by the Fukushima Prefecture Health Survey Evaluation Committee continues to progress, and the sad news is that it has already located 163 cases of cancer. From a scientific point of view, it is clear that these cases are undeniably caused by radioactivity. I also found, from the ratio of male to female patients, that about 75% of cancers in each sex were induced by radiation. Despite this, the Evaluation Committee continues to assert that there is no proof that these cancers are linked to the NPP accident.

Just as the committee insists that the numerous stark cases of thyroid cancer are not linked to radioactivity, so they will attempt to bury all other adverse health impacts in the sand.

******

Environmental pollution by radiation in Japan is ongoing, and, following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, it is the worst it has ever been. This is true whether we look at the amount of radioactivity being released via the long-term meltdown of the reactor core, which is spewing uncontrollably, while the government and mass media collaborate in the cover-up. From the standpoints of society, economics and preventative medicine, a terrible state of affairs will result if we do not provide public protection to the people affected by the accidents and clarify the nature and extent of environmental damage.

“Cheaper” Countermeasures

The Japanese government has deemed the amount of radioactivity released from the Fukushima accident as one sixth of that which was released from Chernobyl. However, the subsequent revelations suggest that Fukushima’s radioactivity is actually anywhere from 2 to 4 times as high as Chernobyl’s.7 Compared to the explosion of just one reactor at Chernobyl, which had a 1,000,000 kilowatt capacity, the explosion at Fukushima Daiichi involved 4 reactors with a combined output of 2,810,000 kilowatts.

The post-accident maintenance of nuclear reactors between Fukushima and Chernobyl also differs. Seven months after Chernobyl, a steel and cement sarcophagus was built to cover the reactor, thus stopping the further release of radioactive materials. Japan, even after 5 years, continues to let radioactive substances spew out into the air and water, thus worsening the world’s environment.

Without using the necessary basic procedures, they are simply trying to implement “cheaper” countermeasures. The fact that the stricken reactor cannot be managed alone can demonstrate that nuclear power lacks practicality and there is no choice but to abolish it.

As mentioned before, Japan is not honestly disclosing the degree of contamination and is using various measures to underestimate it. They have not published dose readings for radioactive nuclides such as uranium, plutonium, and strontium-90. The monitoring posts, which are supposed to provide public data of radioactivity, give readings that are only around half of the actual doses.

Pediatric thyroid cancer cases in Fukushima have risen to 163. It has been proven scientifically that these are due to radiation. (Tsuda Toshihide et al. have demonstrated this via statistics8; Takamatsu Isamu has examined the relationship between exposure dose and cancer onset rate9; Matsuzaki Michiyuki10 and Yagasaki Katsuma11have studied the relationship of radiation with the sex-differentiated ratio of cancer).

In response to this research, the Fukushima Prefectural Health Evaluation Committee has continued to insist that there is no clear link between cancer and the NPP accident. They are trying to bury all the injuries to health by this denial of a link between radioactivity and the many recorded cases of thyroid cancer. By expunging the record of health damages caused by radiation, they hope to heighten the false impression that NPPs are “safe”. In Japan, excessive utilitarianism goes unmentioned; companies’ profits and the state’s convenience take priority over human life.

The Systemization of Dispersal

The countries surrounding Chernobyl created a “Chernobyl Law” to protect their residents 5 years after the accident. Under this law, the government designated areas that received more than 0.5 millisieverts of radiation each year as “dangerous”, and areas that received between 1 and 5 millisieverts of radiation each year as “areas with relocation rights”, while areas receiving more than 5 millisieverts each year could not be used as residential or agricultural sites. Health checkups and respite trips for children have been covered in a massive budgetary investment by the state in order to protect its residents.

What about Japan? The legal exposure limit for the public is 1 millisievert per year. As previously mentioned, the government has raised the upper threshold to 20 millisieverts per year in their drive to push Fukushima residents to return. The Chernobyl law forbids residence and agriculture in areas where more than 5 millisieverts (per year) of irradiation is expected; in Japan, approximately 1,000,000 people live in such areas.

Under the Basic Law on Atomic Energy, which governs nuclear reactors and related phenomena, the standard for radioactive waste management (the level considered for safe recycling use) is 100 becquerels per kilogram. Notwithstanding this rule, the special law for measures to handle contamination by radioactive substances permits up to 8000 becquerels per kilogram. Contamination dispersal is thus becoming systematized.

A law to support child victims was established, but no maps of radioactive contamination were made, and the areas specified to receive assistance under this law’s “Basic Policy” are limited to Fukushima Prefecture. With this law they have thus made all areas outside Fukushima Prefecture ineligible to receive radioactivity countermeasures.

When looking at the measurements taken by the Nuclear Regulation Authority of the contamination levels in all prefectures, we see that contamination exists everywhere in the country, Okinawa being no exception.

In particular, eastern Japan shows high levels of contamination. 10 prefectures show contamination of more than 1,000 becquerels of Iodine-131 per square meter of land –Tochigi, Ibaraki, Tokyo, Yamagata, Saitama, Chiba, Gunma, Kanagawa, Nagano, and Shizuoka (Readings for Fukushima and Miyagi were not available for a period of time because the measurement equipment were destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami, but other sources confirm high I-131 dispersion in Fukushima). 11 prefectures show more than 1,000 becquerels of Cesium-137, and Cesium-134 – Fukushima, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Tokyo, Yamagata, Saitama, Chiba, Gunma, Kanagawa, Iwate, and Nagano.

These readings are taken from a fixed point, which means that if a radioactive plume does not pass over these points, it will not be measured, and is liable to produce an under-estimation gap by 1 to 2 digits.

Although the Ministry of Education has implemented airborne monitoring, cities with a density of buildings higher than 3 stories present obstacles to this technology, making it unable to record their levels of contamination. Severe contamination is concealed in the Tokyo metropolitan area and other places in the region.

Legal Protection of Citizens

The above facts demonstrate an intentional ignoring of the serious level of radiation pollution. Japanese citizens should recognize radioactivity pollution as a de facto state of affairs.

In order to protect Japanese citizens from radioactivity pollution, the government and administration should take responsibility for protecting victims via a swift application of the regulations exactly as they are laid out under the Basic Law on Atomic Energy. Here we raise some suggestions for administrative policies to enact not only towards evacuees, but all residents. 1. The state should recognize and guarantee citizens’ right to evacuate and relocate. It should also bear responsibility in enacting measures to protect vulnerable victims, especially children.

  1. Health damages that emerge from NPP accidents should be studied on a nation-wide scale, and a study of the conditions of evacuees should be quickly implemented.
  2. Those most vulnerable to radiation should be protected by measures based on a sincere commitment to preventive medicine.
  3. With regard to the numerous early-onset cases of child thyroid cancer that have far exceed such early cases caused by Chernobyl, medical care and compensation should be provided; children and all residents should be protected. Thyroid screening should also be carried out for the entire country.
  4. Measures to prevent the entrance and exit of radioactive substances in all regions should be enacted.
  5. TEPCO’s social responsibility as a victimizer corporation in radioactivity pollution should be clarified.

This is a translation of a modified version of Yagasaki’s three-part article series “Kakusareru naibu hibaku – Fukushima genpatsu jiko no shinso” that appeared in Ryukyu Shimpo on March 16, 17, and 18, 2016. ”

by Yagasaki Katsuma

source with internal reference citations

Post-accident sporadic releases of airborne radionuclides from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site — Environmental Science & Technology

” ABSTRACT: The Fukushima nuclear accident (March 11, 2011) caused the widespread contamination of Japan by direct deposition of airborne radionuclides. Analysis of weekly air filters has revealed sporadic releases of radionuclides long after the Fukushima Daiichi reactors were stabilized. One major discharge was observed in August 2013 in monitoring stations north of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP). During this event, an air monitoring station in this previously scarcely contaminated area suddenly reported 137Cs activity levels that were 30-fold above the background. Together with atmospheric dispersion and deposition simulation, radionuclide analysis in soil indicated that debris removal operations conducted on the FDNPP site on August 19, 2013 are likely to be responsible for this late release of radionuclides. One soil sample in the center of the simulated plume exhibited a high 90Sr contamination (78 ± 8 Bq kg−1 ) as well as a high 90Sr/137Cs ratio (0.04); both phenomena have usually been observed only in very close vicinity around the FDNPP. We estimate that through the resuspension of highly contaminated particles in the course of these earthmoving operations, gross 137Cs activity of ca. 2.8 × 1011 Bq has been released. ”

by Georg Steinhauser, Tamon Niisoe, Kouji H. Harada, Katsumi Shozugawa, Stephanie Schneider, Hans-Arno Synal, Clemens Walther, Marcus Christl, Kenji Nanba, Hirohiko Ishikawa, and Akio Koizumi

read full article

Researchers: No doubt cleanup at Fukushima nuclear plant contaminated rice crops in 2013 — The Asahi Shimbun

” MINAMI-SOMA, Fukushima Prefecture–Radioactive substances that contaminated rice paddies here in 2013 came from the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, an international group of researchers said, rejecting a denial issued by Japan’s nuclear safety authority.

The researchers, led by Akio Koizumi, a professor at Kyoto University’s Graduate School of Medicine, reached the conclusion after analyzing radioactive substances and taking spot readings of radioactivity levels around Minami-Soma.

Koizumi presented the final report of the group, consisting of 11 researchers from Japan, Europe and the United States, to local farmers and other parties at a community center in Minami-Soma on Jan. 17.

“The cause of further contamination was the radioactive particles dispersed from contaminated rubble during the cleanup effort at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant,” Koizumi concluded in the report.

Earlier, the agriculture ministry and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) gave different views on the source of the contaminated rice.

In 2013, rice crops from areas of Minami-Soma were found with unexpectedly high radioactivity levels more than two years after the triple meltdown at the nuclear plant located 20 kilometers south of the city.

One theory was that highly radioactive substances were dispersed when workers were lifting and removing contaminated rubble at the Fukushima plant on Aug. 19 that year. Two workers at the plant were exposed to high doses of radiation during the cleanup process.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said the cause of the contaminated rice was “unknown” although it acknowledged “the possibility of the dispersal of contaminated dust.” The farm ministry discontinued its investigation without specifying the source of the contamination.

The NRA, however, said the contaminated rice was not related to the cleanup work at the nuclear plant.

The Minami-Soma city assembly expressed outrage over the NRA’s stance. Some in the city suspected the NRA of a cover-up.

Koizumi and the other researchers digitally recreated an accidental dispersal of contaminated dust from the plant in August 2013.

They used a new analysis system to estimate the amount of radioactive cesium that spread toward Minami-Soma based on radioactivity readings around the city and other factors.

The group’s cesium estimate was more than 3.6 times the amount initially estimated by the NRA.

The research group in September 2014 also collected soil samples from 10 locations around the contaminated rice paddies to determine the amount of strontium 90 in the area.

They confirmed that the ratio of strontium 90 to radioactive cesium in the soil samples was similar to the ratio that would be found near the Fukushima nuclear plant.

Beta-ray emitting strontium 90 is less airborne and tends to remain within close proximity of nuclear weapon testing sites or nuclear accidents. Radioactive cesium is more volatile and can easily adhere to fine dust spread by the wind.

In general, the amount of strontium 90 decreases the farther it gets from a nuclear plant, compared with radioactive cesium. In fact, hardly any strontium 90 has been detected far away from the Fukushima plant.

Based on the amounts of radioactive particles recorded around Minami-Soma, the researchers concluded that a highly irregular plume of radioactive cesium reached Minami-Soma on the third week of August 2013.

“Every single piece of data in the paper supports the fact that contamination by radioactive dust came from the debris at the nuclear plant,” Koizumi said.

Asked about the NRA’s conclusion, Koizumi said: “It seems they were blinded by their estimated amount of dispersed particles, and their choice for the analysis system was misguided. This kind of attitude would only increase the anxiety of residents in the affected areas.”

The group’s findings were published in the international academic journal Environmental Science & Technology last month after a peer review. ”

by Masakazu Honda and Miki Aoki

source

Tepco completes sea wall to keep tainted Fukushima No. 1 water from reaching sea — The Japan Times

” Tokyo Electric Power Co. announced completion Monday of a 780-meter coastal wall along the heavily damaged reactor buildings of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

Tepco hopes the wall will significantly reduce the amount of contaminated water that has continued to flow into the Pacific more than four years after the 2011 meltdown crisis.

The gigantic wall, which the utility describes as impermeable, has an underground section that reaches as deep as 30 meters. It will reduce the amount of tainted water flowing into the sea from 400 tons to 10 tons a day, according to Tepco’s estimate.

Until Monday, about 400 tons of groundwater was draining along the sides of the buildings and into the sea each day, after being contaminated with fallout from the 2011 meltdown crisis, according to Tepco.

The utility says an estimated 150 tons of underground water is still flowing into the basements of the damaged reactor buildings each day.

The water, some of which has been circulated to cool melted nuclear fuel, is believed to be kept in place within the buildings by pressure exerted by higher underground water levels outside the buildings.

Last month, Tepco, after finally securing the consent of the local fishing industry, started draining underground water from around the plant buildings and dumping it into the sea after subjecting it to decontamination processes.

The launch of this draining operation put Tepco in a position to close the wall’s last 10-meter opening Monday.

The wall is now expected to reduce the amount of radioactive cesium and strontium entering the sea to one-fortieth of previous levels, and that of tritium to one-fifteenth of the previous levels, Tepco officials claimed.

Around 10 a.m., plant workers drove nine 30-meter steel pipes into the ground and injected mortar to fill the gaps between them, thereby closing the wall and mitigating the leakage of what Tepco calls “slightly tainted water” into the sea.

Recent tests of water samples from the nearby sea have detected radioactive substances such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, but scientists have said the density is so low that it poses no immediate danger to human health.

Yet, the ongoing flow of tainted water from the plant has raised anxiety and concerns among local fishermen and many consumers across the country.

Tepco plans to keep monitoring the density of radioactive materials in the nearby sea over the next month.

To isolate the four reactor buildings from the underground water, Tepco hopes to freeze the soil around them by the end of this year with coolant equipment already buried in the ground.

The Nuclear Regulation Authority has yet to give permission for the operation, saying creation of frozen soil could drastically change the underground water level around the plant.

If the water level outside falls lower than that inside, the contaminated water could leak out.

Meanwhile, Tepco has not explained exactly how it will control the water levels, an NRA official said. ”

source with video

**The Human consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accidents — Eiichiro Ochiai, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

” When a very strong earthquake (magnitude 9.0) hit the Pacific ocean side of the northeastern part of the main island of Japan on March 11th (3.11) 2011, the accompanying huge tsunami wiped out many communities along the coast. Close to 20,000 people lost their lives, mainly due to the tsunami. Many who were stripped of their homes and livelihood continue to struggle to recover their ways of life.

One of the most disastrous results of the quake/tsunami was the devastation at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fk-1) of the Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO). The plant is known in Japan as Fk-1 (Fuku-ichi. It released an enormous amount of radioactive material. Its effects on living organisms have already begun to be felt in many ways, though it’s been only four and a half year[s]. It may, however, be premature to make a judgment as to the degree of disaster, in light of the fact that the after-effects of the Chernobyl accident of 1986 are still unfolding.

This article discusses some prominent features of the current situation (as of August 2015) in the aftermath of the Fk-1 accident.

The Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident

Four of the six reactors (units 1~4) on the premises of the Fk-1 plant experienced serious accidents including explosion, while the other two reactors (5 and 6) were not in operation and remained intact, as they are located slightly apart from the others.

Units 1~3 were operating at the time, but shut down automatically when the quake hit. The shutdown reactors need to be continuously cooled, because the fuel rods, though out of fission reaction, release great heat due to the nuclear decaying process of radioactive fission products. The quake caused substantial damage to the reactors, and the cooling systems of units 1~3 did not function properly due to both physical damage and human errors. As a result, the fuel rods in units 1~3 “melted down”.

Water added from outside for cooling purposes reacted with the hot rods to form hydrogen gas. The resulting hydrogen explosion in unit 1 stripped the roof on March 12th. Unit 2 showed no apparent damage, but released an enormous amount of radioactive material through holes created by the quake, mostly on March 15 and thereafter. The explosion at unit 3 on March 14 was most damaging. TEPCO insists that it was also a hydrogen explosion, but many observers offered different opinions, including one that it a small-scale nuclear fission explosion occurred. Unit 4 had no nuclear fuel rod in the reactor, though a large number of spent as well as new fuel rods were in its storage pool. It exploded also, its cause unknown, though TEPCO speculated that hydrogen gas entered from the adjacent unit 3, and exploded.

Release of Radioactive Material from Fk-1

A large amount of radioactive material was released as a result of the accidents. How did it happen? Leakage through cracks and holes made by the quake on some reactors, explosions, intentional vents to relieve pressure, and leakage of cooling water which is contaminated as a result of contact with the melt fuel rod debris.

The amount of radioactive material cannot be determined accurately, and can only be estimated by various means. TEPCO made an estimate of the released amounts of several tens of radioactive nuclides based on the readings of several monitoring posts placed on the premise 1. The initial governmental data 2 were based on these estimates. Some of the official data are presented in Table 1. The government’s assessment of the scale of the release from Fukushima, based on these data, was that the radiation release was relatively small compared to that of Chernobyl (April, 1986 in Ukraine), about one tenth to at most one third.

But these data accounted for only the release into the atmosphere. Radioactive materials were also released into the water systems surrounding the facilities, as well as directly into the ocean. When the amounts released into the water and the ocean were estimated 3, the total amounts released were re-calculated 4. They are shown in Table 1 along with the official data. The ratio of the amount released from Fukushima to that from Chernobyl ranges from 1.2 to 3.1 for the major nuclides, suggesting that the extent of radiation release from Fukushima was very likely more than that from Chernobyl; perhaps more than twice if all were taken account of.

Table 1. The amount of radioactive nuclides released from the Fk-1 accident (2011) compared with those released from the Chernobyl accident (1986)

nuclide Quantity in reactors at Fukushima

at the time of accidenta

The official released amount from Fukushimaa Total amount released from

Fukushimab

Total amount

released from

Chernobylc

Fukushimab

over

Chernobylc

Kr-85 8.37E+16 8.37E+16
Xe-133 1.20E+19 1.1E+19 1.20E+19 6.5E+18 1.85
I-131 6.01E+18 5.0E+17 2.08E+18 1.76E+18 1.18
Cs-134 7.19E+17 1.8E+16 1.65E+17 5.4E+16 3.06
Cs-137 7.00E+17 1.5E+16 1.59E+17 8.5E+16 1.87
Sr-89 5.93E+18 2.0E+15 7.31E+16 1.15E+17 0.636
Sr-90 5.22E+17 1.4E+14 8.49E+15 1.0E+16 0.849
Pu-238 1.47E+16 1.9E+9 1.91E+10 3.5E+13 0.00055
Pu-239 2.62E+15 3.2E+9 3.14E+9 3.0E+13 0.00011
H-3 3.40E+15

E+18 means 1018; a. ref 3, b. ref 4, c. ref. 5

Radioactive materials are still continuously coming out; and the data shown in the table do not take account of them. For example, Fig. 1 shows the radiation levels (Bq/L) of Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, H-3 and all beta sources found in one of the drainage systems in the facility, which drained out into the ocean between April 2014 and Feb 2015 6. The amounts leaked out through drainage systems are given in Table 2 6. Substantial amounts continue to leak out. The main reason is that 300 tons of cooling water is being added daily to keep the fuel rod debris cold. That cooling water is immediately contaminated, and leaks out as a number of gaps/holes were created by the quake, though an effort has been made to contain and store it in tanks. Eventually TEPCO hopes to decontaminate the water collected, and return it to nature. How successfully decontamination procedures are being carried out is not known. There are other sources of water. One is subterranean water, which flows through the premises, particularly under the contaminated buildings. This has not yet been halted.

Fig. 1. Radioactivity of K-drain system in Fk-1 premises

Table 2 Leaked amount of radioactive material through drainage systems in Fk-1 premises

Are radioactive materials still leaking out into the atmosphere as well? No obvious phenomena, such as explosions, have been observed since March 2011, though sudden rises in temperature of the reactors have occurred occasionally. However, some signs of plumes are still often observed visually (as dense fog) as well as on the monitoring posts placed all over Fukushima prefecture and throughout Japan. Monitoring post data are daily posted on the internet 7. Occasionally sudden peaks (spikes) appear on a number of posts, near and far. If time sequences are carefully taken account of, it seems, they could show the flow of a plume. Such a plume flow was seen throughout Japan on April 14, 2015. Spike phenomena occurred on April 8/9 and May 16, 2015, as well. Fig. 2 shows an example of a spike phenomenon on April 9 in Iidate-mura 30 km northwest of Fk-1. This is not a complete record; it is only what this writer observed in periodic checks.

 

Fig. 2. Spikes observed in a monitoring post in Iidate-mura, Fukushima

Each time there are spikes on monitors, the government attributes such a phenomenon to a “malfunctioning monitor”, and shuts down such posts, until the readings return to normal (regular) levels. It is rather strange that a number of monitoring posts (all across Japan) go out of order simultaneously or rather in sequence. This phenomenon indicates that sudden releases of radiation are still happening occasionally, but how often, on what scale, and their causes are not known.

All these events suggest that the accidents are “far from contained”, and radioactive materials are still leaking out. In sum, the overall radioactive materials released from the Fk-1 accidents are already larger than that of Chernobyl and will increase further unless measures are taken to stop these leakages.

Distribution of Radiation Levels

How far and how widely the radioactive materials are dispersed, i.e., the radiation levels at various locations, are constantly monitored not only by officials as mentioned above, but also by civil activists. Unfortunately the official data may not be reliable, as many observers have noticed. Civil activists have compared the monitoring values with their own readings and found the monitor readings lower by as much as 50% at many locations. The structure of the monitor itself often prevents the true reading of radiation. It has been pointed out, for example, that a metal plate placed just under the measuring device shields radiation coming from below 8.

A monitor placed by the government reads the so-called spatial dose; i.e., the supposed external exposure dose at 1 meter above the ground. The radioactivity is measured in terms of Bq and, if equipped, the energy value of the radiation measures is combined to indicate the spatial dose value, expressed often in terms of mSv/hr. Most monitors can measure only g-radiation, and many monitors as well as Geiger counter type instruments measure only cpm (counts per minute), convert it to Bq values, which are converted to Sv values assuming that radiation is due to cesium (Cs-137). Cs-137 has a relatively long half-life of 30 years and is produced in a significant quantity in the fission reaction. The spatial dose is due to many other nuclides such as strontium (Sr)-89/90, tritium (H-3) and iodine (I)-129/131, but the contribution from these and other nuclides is not taken account of, or rather is counted as Cs-137. It is a sort of measure of radiation level, but does not represent the true exposure dose. However, this value is commonly used in assessing the danger level due to radiation.

A few readings will be cited here to illustrate the typical radiation levels given by the government. Some readings at monitoring posts on March 31, 2015 were: 6~10.5 mSv/hr in Hutaba-cho where Fk-1 is located, 4~17 mSv/h in Okuma-cho, just south of Hutaba (several km from Fk-1) and 1.7~3.6 mSv/hr in Tomioka-cho, south of Okuma (i.e, 10 km south of Fk-1). These are readings in highly contaminated areas.

On April 14, 2015 when a plume seemed to have been released, several readings (except the spike, which was a sudden rise to twice or higher level) were: 0.03~0.04 mSv/hr in Hokkaido (northernmost island); 0.02~0.05 mSv/hr in Aomori; 0.02~0.05 mSv/hr in Iwate; 0.04~0.12 mSv/hr in Miyagi (just north of Fukushima); 0.14~0.30 mSv/hr in Soma city, Fukushima; 0.05~0.12 mSv/hr in Tochigi; 0.08~0.09 mSv/hr in Tokyo; 0.03~0.06 mSv/hr in Kyoto; 0.05~0.08 mSv/hr in Hiroshima; 0.04~0.06 mSv/hr in Fukuoka.

These are recorded on the monitoring posts, but many places are not covered by monitoring posts, where much higher radiation levels have been recorded; i.e., “hot spots”. Recently reported examples were: 1.23 mSv/hr in western Tokyo on July 23, 2.92 mSv/hr in Saitama on July 25, 4.8 mSv/hr in Iwaki (30 km south of Fk-1) on Aug. 2 9.

Let’s assume that you are standing on a location where the monitoring post showed 0.1 mSv/hr throughout a whole year. Then, you will be exposed to 0.9 mSv/year (0.1 mSv/hr x 24 hrs x 365 days=876 mSv/year=0.9 mSv/y). The Japanese government calculates the dose per year by assuming that one would stay in open areas for 8 hrs and for the rest of the day in buildings, where the radiation level is assumed to be about 40% of the outside. This calculation would make the exposure dose significantly lower than the real value; in the example above, it would be 0.54 mSv/year. This assumption is arbitrary, indeed, the inside of a building has often been found to have radiation levels as high as that of the immediate outside.

The official exposure dose allowed is currently set as 1 mSv/year (see note at the end). This corresponds to a dose rate of 0.18 mSv/hr according to the governmental way of calculation. It is further degraded to 0.23 mSv/hr with some other arbitrary assumptions, and this value is regarded as the permissible level of dose rate. So dose rate below this value is supposed to be OK. If you are exposed directly to this level for a year, then your accumulated dose will be 2 mSv/year. In other words, the government limit of 1 mSv/year is actually close to 2 mSv/year in reality. The government is currently trying to raise the 1mSv/year limit to 20 mSv/year. If 20 mSv/year is approved and people are forced to return to their previous homes under this condition, they will be exposed to dangerously high levels of radiation. It must be pointed out, though, that there is no safe level.

Radioactive iodine affects the thyroid immediately. Iodine-131 is short-lived with a half-life of 8 days, and I-129 has a very long half-life of 15.7 million years. Both would be readily absorbed into the thyroid gland, as iodine is used to make thyroid hormones. In the nuclear reactor, both are produced in comparable amounts, but I-131 affects the thyroid more seriously. An entity with a shorter half-life emits radiation more often than that with a longer half-life in the same chemical quantity. The distribution of I-131 in the environment is difficult to determine accurately, as it is short-lived.

In Dec. 2014, the official nuclear regulatory committee (Japan) published a report to indicate that Fk-1 is still emitting I-131 and other I-radioisotopes 10. According to their report, trans-uranium Cm-242 and other such nuclides were formed in the fuel rods during the operation, and they fission spontaneously, as a result producing radioactive nuclides including I-131. The possible maximum amount of I-radioisotopes released from this source has been estimated as 28 mSv/week (=170 mSv/hr) in terms of equivalent dose for child thyroid at the border of the premises of Fk-1 10.

An alternative expression of contamination is the radioactivity of soil, typically Bq value per kg of soil, which often is converted to Bq/m2. It is assumed that the density of soil is 1.3 g/cm3 and that the radioactive material exists in the uppermost 5 cm of the soil, so that Bq/m2 value is 65 x the value in Bq/kg. This value (Bq/kg) is real, measured directly by an instrument on a sample of soil. Hence this may be more reliable in expressing the level of contamination than the spatial exposure dose. Besides, the source of radiation (from a soil sample) can be readily identified. This is not sufficient, however, as minute radioactive particles can be floating above the soil, which can be measured as spatial radiation.

In all these expressions, a fundamental uncertainty is that radiation levels may not be constant over time. Radioactive material decays over time and can move due to water flow or wind. Therefore, radiation levels have to be monitored continuously.

It must be pointed out that the external exposure dose level obtained from measurements of this kind (i.e., spatial dose and soil contamination) is less important than the internal exposure dose, which is not necessarily related to the external dose. The significance of internal exposure will be outlined below. The only thing that can be said here is that people living in a place of higher spatial dose level and/or higher soil contamination would have a higher risk of being exposed internally; but there is no proven direct correlation, and cannot be.

The more serious factor, internal exposure, is supposed to be measured by the whole body counter. But it can measure only g-radiation, and cannot measure the more serious a- and b-radiation. Besides, it measures only the radiation coming out of a body at the time of the test, and cannot determine the more meaningful accumulated exposure dose. Hence whole body counter results can only be used to give a tested person mental relief in cases where the reading is low or non-detectable. But, even that could be dangerous, if the source inside is emitting a and/or b radiation.

Reality of Internal Exposure

The effects of radioactive fallout from an accident of a nuclear power reactor as well as a nuclear bomb explosion are caused mostly by “internal exposure”, yet no adequate attention has been given to this aspect by the authorities and the associated scientists. The sources of the internal exposure are minute radioactive particles floating in the air, which can be inhaled, and contaminated food and drinks consumed. Radioactivity of foods and drinks produced in the contaminated area is monitored, and those with activity higher than the regulation values cannot legally be marketed.

One cannot well safeguard against ingesting radioactive material, unless one measures the radioactivity of everything one takes in, which is not possible. The issue of “internal exposure” is complicated, and would require another detailed article. For now, three photographs are shown below to illustrate the reality of internal exposure.

Figs. 3 and 4 are the trace of a-particles in the preserved tissues of victims of the atomic bomb explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is not easy technically to take this kind of photo, and scientists succeeded in doing so only recently (11, 12). The source of the first trace is plutonium from the Nagasaki bomb, and that of the second is uranium from the Hiroshima bomb. The plutonium and uranium embedded in the tissues of atomic bomb victims are still emitting a-radiation after 70 years. This says that the fallout of the atomic bomb explosions, which included uranium in the Hiroshima bomb and plutonium in the Nagasaki bomb, somehow got into the body of the victims and stuck in those tissues, and emitted and destroyed the surrounding tissues for 70 years. Both plutonium and uranium have a long half-life, millions of years or more.

Fig. 3. a-Particles travel straight even in tissues. The linear traces are those emitted by plutonium in the preserved kidney tissues of an A-bomb victim in Nagasaki (70 years ago) 11 Fig. 4. A trace of a-particle of uranium in the lung tissue of a Hiroshima victim 12 Fig. 5. The heart muscle fibers are broken in the heart of a man (43 years old) who died of heart disease in the most contaminated area (Belarus) of the Chernobyl accident 13

Fig. 5 shows the heart muscle fibers of a victim of the Chernobyl accident 13. They are broken at many places. Likely the b and g radiation from Cs-137 (and others) damaged the fibers by breaking the chemical bonds. The traces of b and g cannot be visualized in such samples.

Thyroid Cancers among Children in Fukushima

The authorities, such as ICRP and IAEA, have acknowledged that thyroid cancers in children can be caused by radiation, likely due to I-131. They have also recognized the causal relationship between leukemia and radiation. But they deny a causal relationship in the case of other cancers and other diseases, despite the fact that many studies and reports have shown that all sorts of disease including cancers can be caused by radiation.

The rate of thyroid cancer is very low among children (those under 18 years) under normal circumstances; 1 or 2 per million children per year. Fukushima prefecture started to investigate abnormalities in the thyroid gland in children (under 18 years old) in 2011. Soon they found high rates of abnormalities: nodules, cysts, and then tumors mostly malignant. By the spring of 2015 they have counted 126 thyroid cancer cases (mostly papillary) among 370,000 children in Fukushima 14. This rate amounts to 340/1,000,000 over 4 years, i.e., 85/1,000,000/year. This is abnormally high, approximately 60 times the normal rate, even much higher than that reported in Chernobyl.

Yet, the authorities and the committee in charge of this investigation have denied causality to radiation from Fk-1 accidents. They argued against causality thus:

(a) Screening effects, that is, they used sophisticated techniques to show that cancers that are ordinarily non-detectable were detected. However, officials admitted recently that screening effects would not be able to explain such a high rate 15.

(b) In the case of Chernobyl thyroid cancers in children appeared only 4 years after the accident. It is too early for Fukushima children to get thyroid cancers. This argument has been rebutted by an article published in the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 16.

(c) They checked a few other places in Japan, and say that the thyroid cancer rate in Fukushima is similar to that found in Aomori, Nagasaki and Yamanashi 17. They imply that Fukushima is not abnormal. This study is based on a very small sample in which only one cancer was found; hence the result is not statistically meaningful.

(d) It is too soon for thyroid cancers to appear. It usually takes four to five years. This is in addition to the argument of comparison with Chernobyl (b) above. Hence the cancers found here should have started before the accidents.

(e) The amount of radioactive material released was far lower than that of Chernobyl, and hence would not have such effects as those found in Chernobyl.

A recent report 18 indicates that the latent period for thyroid cancer can be as short as one year in children. The amount of radioactive material released (e) has been discussed earlier, and has been shown to be at least as high as, or even higher than, that of Chernobyl. All of these arguments by the authorities are based on weak or incorrect information.

Careful studies of the relationship between the locations where children who got thyroid cancer live and the radiation distribution have revealed correlations, though these are not perfect. A correlation obtained by an analysis is shown in Fig. 6 19. This indicates a likely causality; i.e., radiation caused the thyroid cancers, though the dose used here does not necessarily represent an accurate value of I-131 but rather a general radiation level. Thyroid cancers are increasing among adults, too. As seen in Table 4, the increase over 2010-2013 was more than 200 % in Fukushima as well as in adjacent prefectures: Ibaragi, Gunma and Tochigi.

Fig. 6. Pediatric thyroid cancer rate vs spatial exposure rate for different areas in Fukushima prefecture. The line is the linear regression line. R2 implies that the line accounts for 54% of the variance in thyroid cancer rate due to radiation.

Other Diseases are also Increasing in Fukushima since the Accident

No systematic investigation has been published officially on the health effects of radiation as a result of the Fukushima accident. However, some statistical data may be indicative of significant trends. All indications are that incidence of many diseases is increasing not only in Fukushima but also all over Japan.

Table 3 shows the number of diagnosed cases recorded at Fukushima (prefectural) Medical School Hospital (latest published data based on ref. 20). Cancer of the small intestine, which is normally rare, increased by 400% in two years. Eye disease (cataract), brain, heart disease (angina) and all kinds of cancer have increased. Many diseases other than those listed in the table have also increased since the Fk-1 event.

Table 3. Increase in diseases since the accidents: records at the Hospital of Fukushima (prefectural) Medical School

Disease 2010 2011 2012
cataract 150 (100%) 344 (229%) 340 (227%)
angina 222 (100%) 323 (145%) 349 (157%)
bleeding in brain 13 (100%) 33 (253%) 39 (300%)
lung cancer 293 (100%) 504 (172%) 478 (163%)
esophagus cancer 114 (100%) 153 (134%) 139 (122%)
stomach cancer 146 (100%) 182 (125%) 188 (129%)
cancer in small intestine 13 (100%) 36 (277%) 52 (400%)
colon cancer 31 (100%) 60 (194%) 92 (297%)
prostate cancer 77 (100%) 156 (203%) 231 (300%)
shortened pregnancy period + low birth weight 44 (100%) 49 (114%) 73 (166%)

The Problem is Not Confined to Fukushima; Diseases are Increasing All over Japan

Radioactive materials do not stop at the border of Fukushima prefecture. They have spread beyond Fukushima as noted earlier. Accordingly, health effects could be observed in other prefectures, as well. Indeed this turned out to be the case. Unfortunately, no systematic studies of cities or prefectures have been published yet. However, every hospital publishes its activities listing the number of patients with different diseases, the number of surgeries, etc. These data may be indicative of larger patterns in Japan.

The following tables are based on such accounts; collecting data for all hospitals that reported data. They include published data from all prefectures 21. The tables list such data for Fukushima and the surrounding prefectures (Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaragi, Yamagata, Miyagi), the next nearest prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa), and several major prefectures further away (Aichi, Osaka, Fukuoka, Hokkaido and Okinawa).

In three years since the accident, many diseases increased by 40-50% as shown in tables 4-6. These tables were constructed on the basis of collections of data from hospitals across Japan 21. The incidence of thyroid cancer, which is the most sensitive indicator, more than doubled in the three years 2010 to 2013 not only in Fukushima but in neighboring Gunma, Tochigi and Ibaragi to the south of Fukushima. It increased by amounts ranging from 26 to 61 percent in all other prefectures listed below, as well. The national total rose by 42%.

Table 4. Thyroid cancers increased everywhere since the 11 March 2011 accident 21

prefecture 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013/2010
Fukushima 119 187 199 271 228%
Tochigi 116 218 211 235 203%
Gunma 108 124 185 350 217%
Ibaragi 61 115 136 138 226%
Yamagata 95 128 146 139 146%
Miyagi 248 343 378 399 161%
Saitama 203 226 306 301 148%
Chiba 260 340 410 352 135%
Tokyo 1833 2819 2874 2884 157%
Kanagawa 469 664 656 749 160%
Aichi 525 632 819 949 120%
Osaka 650 938 1048 1039 160%
Fukuoka 583 736 629 587 101%
Hokkaido 855 1083 1151 1227 144%
Okinawa 82 104 117 103 126%
Japan 10816 14909 15635 16023 148%

It is known that Cs-137 (as well as Cs-134) affects the myocardial muscles, causing heart diseases, myocardial infarction and other diseases. Table 5 shows increases in myocardial infarction. Not only neighboring prefectures but also Tokyo and as far away as Okinawa showed significant increases.

Table 5. Increase of myocardial infarction 21

prefecture 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013/2010
Fukushima 507 622 668 675 133%
Tochigi 722 878 1014 977 135%
Gunma 538 710 797 821 153%
Ibaragi 700 948 1077 1212 173%
Miyagi 598 718 831 901 151%
Saitama 1873 2465 2733 2752 147%
Chiba 1447 2008 2558 2604 135%
Tokyo 3680 4849 5581 5605 180%
Kanagawa 2361 2871 3421 3657 155%
Aichi 2212 2877 3158 3287 149%
Osaka 2335 3224 3648 3652 156%
Fukuoka 1533 1996 2326 2285 149%
Okinawa 437 572 537 669 153%
Japan 35411 46109 51947 53400 151%

Leukemia is another specific indicator of radiation effect. The data shown in Table 6 indicate that it increased over 2010-2013 by as much as three times in neighboring Gunma while the total for Japan increased by 142%.

Table 6. Acute leukemia is also increasing 21

Prefecture 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013/2010
Fukushima 108 97 79 230 213%
Tochigi 363 418 340 322 89%
Gunma 113 178 267 350 310%
Ibaragi 251 309 351 324 129%
Yamagata 121 117 172 135 112%
Miyagi 191 236 199 241 126%
Saitama 266 336 590 757 285%
Chiba 449 430 529 576 128%
Tokyo 1770 2135 2366 2342 132%
Kanagawa 686 1024 964 1062 155%
Aichi 895 1138 1208 1178 132%
Osaka 869 1210 1393 1623 187%
Fukuoka 686 755 722 767 112%
Hokkaido 449 628 728 830 185%
Okinawa 101 111 111 110 109%
Japan 12820 15498 17015 18167 142%

These are only the tip of the iceberg. Diseases that may not be caused by radiation itself can also be attributable indirectly to radiation effects. Radiation affects lymphatic and also blood producing systems and weakens the immune system. This makes such people more vulnerable to infectious diseases. It is noteworthy in this regard that death from pneumonia seems to have increased significantly since the Fukushima accident. This is only one example.

This could be only the beginning of further serious developments in time. The radiation effects are likely to increase with time. In particular, various solid cancers have relatively long latent periods. They increase after 10 years or later as seen among atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 22.

Concluding Remarks

The Japanese government under Democratic Party rule, declared that the Fukushima accident was over at the end of 2011, and the prime minister in Sept 2013 under the Liberal-Democratic Party at the IOC meeting to select the next Olympic site pronounced that the Fukushima accident had been contained and Tokyo was well prepared for the Olympics.

The real situation is far different, as documented above. Leakage of radioactive materials through various routes continues. The locations and states of the melted fuel rods in the reactors at Fk-1 have yet to be determined. It was found only recently (by use of muon radiation/absorption technique) that the nuclear reactors of units 1 and 2 are indeed devoid of nuclear fuel rods in the core 23, but the technique was insufficient to locate the melted fuel rod debris.

Serious health effects of radiation in general have already been widely observed. It is best to refer to better studied examples of the past: Chernobyl 24 and down-winders of Nevada tests 25. The reality of health effects at Chernobyl due to fallout from the explosive accident as detailed in 26 and summarized in 27 may indicate the future of Fukushima and Japan.

The health effects of radiation are often slow in manifesting, particularly in the case of cancers, though cancer rates have already started to increase in Fukushima and elsewhere, as discussed above. Therefore, more people will be affected by radiation in the years to come, not only in Fukushima, but across Japan.

The health effects have been investigated by the Japanese national and local governments only with respect to Fukushima children’s thyroid abnormalities, as mentioned above. The Fukushima prefectural medical school is reportedly collecting data from all hospitals in Japan, but it has not published the data. Although still in denial of the causal relationship between children’s thyroid cancers and radiation, they finally admitted recently that the cancer rate is indeed abnormally high 15.

Radiation effects are seen not only on human health, but also on many living organisms. A butterfly species has been observed to be affected by radiation, and the effects seem to be inherited from one generation to another 27. Reproductive success of goshawks has decreased in response to higher levels of radiation 28. Many bird species are rapidly decreasing in number 29. Deserted cows have been found to be highly contaminated with cesium-137 and other nuclides 30. Deformed vegetables and fruits have been observed at many locations. These are but a few examples of radiation effects on plants and animals.

The government may be attempting to cover up the negative data it gathers. If it admits the causal relationship between serious health effects and radiation, it would be obliged to abolish the nuclear power plants or at least delay re-opening closed plants. The truth that “radiation (of high energy) is incompatible with life” 31 directly confronts humankind, yet many refuse to recognize it because the government and the nuclear industry and associated scientists in Japan and many other countries continue to suppress the data.

No single nuclear power plant has operated in Japan in the last two years, yet there has been no shortage of electricity. The Japanese government, along with the nuclear industry, has now restarted one of the fifty nuclear power reactors, despite strong opposition by the majority of Japanese and despite the high risk in Japan of further geological activity, both volcanic and earth quakes.

Note: The limit 1 mSv/year was set by the department of science and education of the Japanese government, based on a law (protection against radiation effects due to radioactive isotopes) and a recommendation by ICRP (international commission of radiological protection)

Acknowledgement: Comments and suggestions made by Drs. Anders Moller, Leonard Angles, and Mark Selden are gratefully acknowledged.

Eiichiro Ochiai was born in Japan, and educated up to the PhD in Japan. He taught and conducted research in chemistry at college/universities in Japan, the United States, Canada and Sweden. Publications include “Bioinorganic Chemistry, an Introduction” (Allyn and Bacon, 1977), “Bioinorganic Chemistry, a Survey” (Elsevier, 2008), “Chemicals for Life and Living” (Springer Verlag, 2011), and “A Sustainable Human Civilization Beyond ‘Occupy’ Movements” (Kindle, 2011).

Recommended citation: Eiichiro Ochiai, “The Human Consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accidents”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 38, No. 2, September 28, 2015. “

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