Kyle Cleveland, sociologist at Temple University’s Japan Campus — Enenews

Kyle Cleveland’s speech was published on Apr 29, 2015, on Youtube. His speech was taken off Youtube today, but part of the transcript is still available on Enenews.

” Like everyone else we were seeing what was on the media. The media was very alarmist, and I think ironically, some of what were taken as an overreaction or a panic in the first couple of weeks of the crisis subsequently have been vindicated to be in some ways quite reasonable claims and worries as more information have been revealed, as gov’t reports have been written… Those reports have demonstrated that the situation was really quite more serious at the time than certainly what the government was saying, and certainly what TEPCO was saying at the time. My starting point for my research was looking into the government’s FOIA documents. I was very surprised to see that there is a big difference within the United States government as they were trying to determine just how bad this was. And what I realized in those documents is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission… was recommending a 50-mile (80 km) exclusionary zone. This was an stark contrast to the Japanese government’s recommendation of 30 km. And also I was very interested to see that the the US Navy Pacific Command and particularly naval reactors, was recommending a 200-mile exclusionary zone. So that’s a rather profound gap between 30 kilometers on the one hand with the Japanese government 80 km from the NRC [and] something like over 300 km for the US Navy… But ironically aside from the staff at the Daiichi plant maybe some at the very first people who were hit by the radioactive plume were sailors who run the United States Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group… They detected the plume at about 132 miles distance from the Daiichi plant. The FOIA  documents… demonstrate that these government officials… were very concerned about the levels that they were reading. They were indicating that they were about 30 times above background levels, and that they would exceed a ‘protective action guideline’ criteria within about a 10 hour period… The reason the US Navy had recommended a 200-mile exclusionary zone was that the Yokosuka naval base is about a 163 miles from the Daiichi plant… at the same time that the Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier was detecting the nuclear plume, the George Washington aircraft carrier which was ported down near Yokosuka was also detecting a plume and the result that they were getting were really quite alarming to them. “

Updated 10/1/14: Continuing to piece together March 2011 — The Japan Times

The Japan Times continues to piece together the March 2011 nuclear catastrophe based on recently released transcripts, including the accounts of Tepco management and workers at the Fukushima site during the early stages of the disaster. For more articles based on the transcripts, view an earlier blog post HERE.

Updated Oct. 1, 2014:

1) As radiation levels soared at Fukushima No. 1, plant chief Yoshida rescinded evacuation order

2) Tears, hopeful promises of reunion as Tepco workers evacuated Fukushima No. 1

3) Four days later: ‘Fukushima 50′ recount start of nuclear crisis

Posted Sept. 26, 2014:

Helplessness as reactor 2 lost cooling

source

” While reactors 1 and 3 at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear complex suffered core meltdowns, the cooling system for reactor 2 continued to work for three days despite the loss of power following the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011.

The fact that the reactor 2 core isolation cooling system lasted much longer than expected was a “blessed relief,” Fukushima No. 1 chief Masao Yoshida would later say. If it hadn’t been for that, all three units could have spun out of control simultaneously.

Reactor 2′s cooling system finally stopped functioning at 1:25 p.m. on March 14. With no electricity to reactivate it, workers had to depressurize the reactor pressure vessel housing the nuclear fuel so that firetrucks could pump in seawater.

Using car batteries to manipulate valves and release steam from the vessel, the depressurization process finally started at 6:02 p.m. About 20 minutes later, however, the central control room for reactors 1 and 2 reported that the water level had drained to 3.7 meters below the top of the nuclear fuel in reactor 2, leaving it fully exposed. There was also no sign the seawater was entering the reactor.

Just then, a member of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s firefighting unit returned to the emergency response office and said the firetrucks that were supposed to be injecting water into the reactor had run out of fuel. Yoshida, 56, had already issued instructions that the trucks be kept refueled on a continuous basis.

“Didn’t I tell you?” Yoshida asked, looking up helplessly from his desk at the center of the emergency response office.

Yoshida would later recall that this felt like a “turning point,” beyond which “we had run out of all options and I thought I might really die.”

With no time to lose, the firefighting team immediately rushed back to the firetrucks, having to carry the fuel containers themselves because the tanker had a flat tire after driving over rubble scattered by the hydrogen explosion that had ripped through the reactor 3 building earlier that day.

In the emergency response office, Toshiko Kogusuri, 55, of Tepco’s management team, had been secretly ordered by the head of the team to secure as many buses at the plant as possible. Kogusuri felt Yoshida was starting to consider an evacuation. She asked officials of partner companies in the office building to lend their buses, saying she needed them for on-site transportation of workers.

That was a lie, but the companies did not ask questions and agreed to cooperate.

Just before 8 p.m., about 700 Tepco employees and 150 other workers from other companies, including plant manufacturers and Tepco-affiliated firms, were inside the building. More than 90 minutes had passed since the firetrucks had stopped injecting water into the reactor.

Yoshida felt he should no longer keep contract workers, who had worked day and night from the beginning of the crisis on March 11, on-site.

Many workers were sitting in a corridor on the second floor and on the stairs of the office building. Yoshida went up to them and said: “Thank you for dealing with the situation until now. It is OK to go home. Please evacuate carefully as roads on the way may have caved in.”

He spoke in such a calm tone that the workers did not realize the gravity of the situation.

The contract workers all departed, some in their cars, by roughly 8:30 p.m., leaving only Tepco employees at the plant. By that time, Kogusuri had managed to secure six buses. Yoshida then asked the head of Tepco’s management team whether there was any place people could evacuate to.

Tepco’s local thermal power station and the Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant were nominated. The team head told Yoshida that the No. 2 plant was ready, having prepared a facility for the injured and a gymnasium to house the others.

At about 8 p.m., the injection of seawater into reactor 2 started after the firetrucks had been refueled, to the relief of the emergency response office. Even so, the situation remained tense because radioactive steam still had to be vented from the reactor to prevent the containment vessel from rupturing, which would expose the nuclear fuel to the external environment.

With workers unable to operate the venting valves, the pressure continued to build, to the point that the water injection had to be halted again.

Shiro Hikita, at 56 an experienced leader of one of the equipment restoration teams, felt that the reactor’s containment vessel could break at any time. “If there was a switch somewhere to end this situation, I would go out there to push it. I wouldn’t even mind dying in order to do it,” he thought to himself.

Early on March 15, silence engulfed the emergency response office as the point of no return neared. Yoshida stood up and started staggering around, mumbling to himself, “It’s all over.”

As he returned to his seat, he leaned back in his chair, crossed his arms and closed his eyes.

He was later quoted by aides as saying that he was thinking about what might happen if the reactor 2 containment vessel failed, discharging a catastrophic amount of radioactive materials: Tepco would have to abandon any pretense of controlling the situation inside the No. 1 plant and might even have to abandon the No. 2 facility. People from Fukushima to Tokyo, about 220 km away, might have to evacuate.

He could not think of a way to avoid such a scenario.

Hikita, the equipment team leader, saw Yoshida’s body slide from the chair onto the floor. At first he thought Yoshida had collapsed but then realized he was sitting cross-legged as if meditating. With his eyes closed, Yoshida did not move for several minutes.

Yoshida later said he was calling to mind the faces of his longest-serving colleagues: “There were about 10 or so. I thought those guys might be willing to die with me.”

At that point, the building housing the emergency response office was still the safest place at the plant, but there was the risk of contamination if the reactor 2 containment vessel ruptured.

Yoshida was searching for the right time to allow Tepco employees to leave the plant, except for a skeleton crew to keep watch over the reactors’ condition and to continue the water injection process. But even if all of his crew stayed on-site, there was only so much they could do, Yoshida thought to himself. ”

* * *

Tepco plea to evacuate enraged Kan

source

” FUKUSHIMA — A senior Tokyo Electric Power Co. official broke down and wept in the prime minister’s office when the utility felt it had exhausted all options to prevent an utter catastrophe at the Fukushima No. 1 plant.

“I’m sorry. We’ve tried many things, but we are in a situation beyond our control,” Susumu Kawamata, 54, head of Tepco’s Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, told Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda in March 2011 before bursting into tears.

A member of the government’s nuclear safety panel who witnessed the scene thought it spelled the end for one of Japan’s biggest companies.

Shortly after 4 a.m. on March 15, Prime Minister Naoto Kan was sitting face to face with Tepco President Masataka Shimizu, telling him that withdrawing workers from the No. 1 plant was not an option. By that stage, the ravaged complex had experienced hydrogen explosions in the buildings housing reactors 1 and 3 and was facing a potential rupture of the reactor 2 containment vessel.

About 8½ hours prior to that meeting, Tepco’s top-level officials had started to consider evacuating employees from the plant. At around 7:30 p.m. on March 14, Tepco Managing Director Akio Komori, who was at an emergency response center set up 5 km from the plant, suggested the idea during a teleconference with officials at the utility’s Tokyo head office.

“If we don’t make a decision at some point, things could get crazy. Please start setting the criteria for evacuation,” Komori, 58, requested.

Tepco Executive Vice President Sakae Muto, 60, ordered his subordinates at the head office to craft an evacuation plan, while Fukushima No. 1 chief Masao Yoshida started to secure enough buses. Procedures to send employees to Tepco’s Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant were also being decided.

Shimizu, Tepco’s 66-year-old president, phoned Kaieda, who had been placed in charge of dealing with the unfolding disaster, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, 46, repeatedly to seek approval for the “evacuation” of workers.

But Shimizu did not communicate clearly that Tepco would maintain a minimum core of employees to monitor the situation and continue to oversee water injection into the three reactors that had suffered core meltdowns.

Kaieda, 62, said he thought Tepco was seeking approval for a “complete withdrawal” from the plant and turned down Shimizu’s request. But at 3 a.m. on March 15, as the condition of reactor 2 worsened, Kaieda decided to ask Kan, 64, to make a decision. He woke up Kan and briefed him on the situation.

“If people withdraw, the eastern part of Japan will be destroyed,” Kan replied, and immediately summoned Shimizu to his office. As soon as Shimizu set foot inside the reception room, Kan lashed into him, saying, “I heard that you are thinking about a withdrawal, but that’s impossible.”

The Tepco president’s response — “we do not have in mind such a thing as withdrawal” — was stunning to Haruki Madarame, 62, the head of the government’s nuclear safety panel who was present for the talks. Madarame later recalled wondering, “What happened to all those talks” about getting the Tepco workers out?

While officials in the prime minister’s office had misunderstood Tepco’s intentions, Shimizu was also at fault for a lack of clarity in his statements.

Kan then told Shimizu he would launch a joint accident response task force. Based in Tepco’s head office, the unprecedented task force saw the government and Tepco jointly deal with the escalating crisis.

Kan announced he was leaving for Tepco’s head office right away, but Shimizu pleaded for two hours to make the necessary preparations. Kan turned and ordered Shimizu to have everything ready within an hour.

The prime minister was still in a white-hot rage when he arrived at Tepco headquarters, unable to hide his distrust and fury toward the company.

“Tepco will go 100 percent bust if it withdraws. You won’t be able to escape even if you try!” he screamed at Tepco Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 70, Shimizu and other senior executives before 200 other Tepco employees present. “It doesn’t matter if senior (Tepco) officials in their 60s go to the site and die! I will also go. President, chairman — make up your minds!”

Kan’s diatribe, which continued more than 10 minutes, was relayed live to employees in the emergency response office at the Fukushima No. 1 plant via a teleconference system.

Kan later said he was totally unaware that he had been “yelling at everyone,” explaining, “I might have used strong words to tell them to somehow hang on until the last minute, but I didn’t mean to scold them.”

Kan was one of many senior politicians who, up until that point, were unaware Tepco had set up a teleconference system connecting its head office with Fukushima No. 1.

“I was really surprised,” said Kan, who had learned of the March 12 hydrogen explosion in the reactor 1 building from the TV news rather than Tepco. “There was this huge screen connected to the No. 1 plant. I wondered why information was coming so slowly to the prime minister’s office given the existence of this system.”

Although the joint task force was meant to improve communications, Kan soon realized it was too late to rein in the crisis.

Up at Fukushima No. 1, Takeyuki Inagaki, 47, head of one of the plant’s equipment restoration teams, was among the hundreds of employees in the emergency response office who witnessed Kan’s tirade via the teleconference system. “Even though we were doing our best, we felt like we had been shot in the back with a machine gun,” he later recalled.

Yoshida, 56, the plant chief, was about to answer a call from the Tokyo office when a chilling sound swept through the response office at 6:14 a.m, albeit duller than that of the two previous hydrogens blasts.

Those present felt their blood freeze as they were told by reactor operators that the pressure inside the reactor 2 suppression chamber, connected to the containment vessel, had dropped to zero.

If the chamber did not remain airtight, radioactive steam could pour out into the external environment, leaving no safe place inside the plant or in the surrounding area.

“The suppression chamber might have a gapping hole. A hell of a lot of radioactive substances could come out,” Inagaki informed Yoshida, who instantly decided it was time to evacuate the site. “

Fukushima No. 1 chief feared nuclear doom for eastern Japan — The Japan Times

” The chief of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant said in testimony before his death that he feared the core meltdowns he was trying to contain in March 2011 would cause catastrophic damage to eastern Japan, government documents show.

“Our image was a catastrophe for eastern Japan,” Masao Yoshida told a government panel probing the Fukushima nuclear crisis. “I thought we were really dead.”

Yoshida wanted his testimony to remain confidential after his death because the account might contain mistakes from the confusion created by the crisis triggered by the massive earthquake and tsunami of March 11. But leaks to two major Japanese dailies prompted the government last week to announce its intent to disclose most of the documents, which detail the drama that took place during the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl.

According to documents obtained Saturday, Yoshida rejected the government’s opinion that the plant owner Tokyo Electric Power Co. attempted a “complete withdrawal” of all staff from the plant on March 15. He was also angry with Tepco headquarters and the administration of then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan, which he thought had failed to understand the dire situation his workers were facing on the ground.

“We did not escape,” Yoshida is quoted as saying in the roughly 400 pages of testimony, scheduled to be released next month.

Yoshida’s testimony was reflected in the panel’s final report in July 2012 along with those of more than 770 other people involved in the disaster. Yoshida died of esophageal cancer the following July at age 58.In May, the daily Asahi Shimbun reported in Japanese and English that 90 percent of the plant’s workers left the damaged complex despite being told by Yoshida to stay put, citing his testimony. But Yoshida did not say they were violating his order on purpose.

At one serious point in the crisis, on March 14, 2011, when it looked like the containment vessel of reactor No. 2 was going to fail and pollute the area with high amounts of radiation, Yoshida said he thought he was finished.

“I really don’t want to recall this part,” he said, because he was bracing for the worst — a total failure in which the fuel melts and breaches both the pressure vessel and the containment vessel.

“All the radioactive materials would go out and be scattered,” he said.

But the workers who were failing to inject water into the No. 2 reactor to cool the molten fuel caught a break when the air pressure in the containment vessel dropped, allowing the fire engines to get the water in.

When the Asahi first reported the contents of the testimony, the government said the documents would be kept confidential to honor Yoshida’s wishes. But the government has since reversed itself because withholding the documents amid the leaks might actually contradict Yoshida’s wishes. ”

source

Updated 8/27/14: Fukushima mistakes revealed: NHK World; Kan slams Tepco over request to “withdraw” from crippled plant — GlobalPost

Updated Aug. 27, 2014: Watch NHK World video, “Fukushima mistakes revealed”

* * *

Posted Aug. 26, 2014:

Another piece of the March 2011 puzzle:

” An official of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s nuclear power division wept at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo as the utility felt it had exhausted all options to prevent the worst from happening at the crisis-hit Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011.

“I’m sorry. We’ve tried many things, but we are in a situation beyond our control,” Susumu Kawamata, the 54-year-old head of the Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, told industry minister Banri Kaieda before breaking down.

A government nuclear safety panel member who witnessed the scene thought it marked the end of one of the most prestigious companies in Japan.

Shortly after 4 a.m. on March 15, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, 64, was sitting face to face with TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu, 66, telling him that the utility does not have the option of withdrawing its people from the plant, which had already experienced explosions at the Nos. 1 and 3 reactor buildings and was facing fears of a reactor containment rupture.

It was about eight and a half hours before their meeting that TEPCO’s top-level officials started considering the evacuation of its employees from the plant.

At around 7:30 p.m. on March 14, TEPCO’s Managing Director Akio Komori, who was at an emergency response center set up about 5 kilometers from the plant, started off the discussion at a teleconference session with the officials at the Tokyo head office.

“If we don’t make a decision at some point, things could get crazy. Please start setting the criteria for evacuation,” Komori, 58, said.

Executive Vice President Sakae Muto, 60, ordered his subordinates at the head office to craft an evacuation plan, while Fukushima Daiichi plant chief Masao Yoshida started arrangements to secure buses. Procedures to send employees to TEPCO’s Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant were also being decided.

Shimizu phoned Kaieda, the 62-year-old economy, trade and industry minister in charge of dealing with the accident, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, 46, many times to seek approval of staff withdrawal, which he called an “evacuation.”

But Shimizu did not say clearly that TEPCO would keep the minimum necessary number of people inside the plant to monitor the situation and to continue water injections into the troubled reactors.

Kaieda said he thought TEPCO was seeking a “complete withdrawal” from the plant and had turned down the request from Shimizu.

At around 3 a.m. on March 15 when the condition of the No. 2 reactor deteriorated, Kaieda decided to ask Kan to make a judgment on the issue. He woke up the prime minister who was taking a nap on a sofa and briefed him about the situation.

“If people withdraw, the eastern part of Japan will be destroyed,” Kan said, rejecting the idea and having Shimizu come over to his office.

As Shimizu stepped inside the reception room on the fifth floor of the office, Kan immediately said, “I heard that you are thinking about a withdrawal, but that’s impossible.”

Shimizu’s response was stunning to Haruki Madarame, the 62-year-old head of the government’s nuclear safety panel who was also attending the talks. Shimizu said in a thin voice, “We do not have in mind such a thing as withdrawal.”

Madarame said later, “I thought, what happened to all those talks” about getting workers out?

Officials in the prime minister’s office had misunderstood TEPCO’s intentions, while the utility’s president was at fault for making unclear remarks.

The exchanges led Kan to launch an unprecedented accident response task force in which the government and TEPCO would jointly deal with the nuclear crisis inside the utility’s head office in Tokyo.

The prime minister told Shimizu he would set up the task force and that he would go to TEPCO’s head office right away. Shimizu said he needed about two hours for preparations, but Kan told Shimizu to get it done in an hour.

Kan was still furious when he arrived at TEPCO headquarters, unable to disguise his distrust of the company.

“TEPCO will go 100 percent bust if it withdraws. You won’t be able to escape even if you try!” Kan yelled at TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 70, Shimizu and other executives. There were about 200 TEPCO employees in the same room.

“It doesn’t matter if senior officials in their 60s go to the site and die. I will also go. President, chairman, make up your minds!” Kan said.

Kan’s speech continued for more than 10 minutes, which was relayed to employees inside the emergency response office at the Fukushima Daiichi plant through a real-time information-sharing teleconference system.

Kan later said he was totally unaware that he had been “yelling at everyone.” “I might have used strong words to tell them to somehow hang on until the last minute, but I didn’t mean to scold them.”

Kan was among the many politicians who came to know for the first time that TEPCO had a teleconference system hooked up to the crisis-hit plant.

“I was really surprised. There was this huge screen connected to the Daiichi plant. I wondered why information was coming so slowly to the prime minister’s office despite the existence of this system,” said Kan, who had been irritated to learn of the explosion at the No. 1 reactor building on March 12 from the TV news before TEPCO reported it to the government.

The joint task force was meant to improve communication between the government and TEPCO. But Kan would soon realize that it was too late to stop the crisis that started March 11 from growing more serious.

At the Fukushima Daiichi plant, hundreds of people inside the emergency response office were glued to the teleconference monitor showing the angry prime minister.

“Even though we were doing our best here, we felt we were being shot in the back with a machine gun,” Takeyuki Inagaki, 47-year-old leader of one of the equipment restoration teams, recalled.

After Kan finished talking, he moved to another room where there was also a monitor to communicate with the plant.

Yoshida, 56, was about to answer a call from the Tokyo office when a dull sound reached the emergency response office at about 6:14 a.m. The impact was smaller than that of the two previous explosions, but it was not an earthquake.

People’s blood ran cold as they heard from reactor operators that the pressure inside the No. 2 reactor’s suppression chamber, which is connected to the reactor’s containment vessel, had dropped to zero.

If the chamber was not airtight, a massive amount of highly radioactive steam could be released outside. Then there would be no safe place inside the plant, or in surrounding areas.

“The suppression chamber might have got a huge hole. A hell of a lot of radioactive substances could come out,” Inagaki told Yoshida.

Yoshida instantly decided it was time for evacuation. ”

source

Policy recommendations — Helen Caldicott

As promised in the last post, here are the policy recommendations formulated by Helen Caldicott from the symposium held Sunday, July 7, 2013, at the International House of Japan in Roppongi, Tokyo. These recommendations followed Caldicott’s presentation, “The Medical Implications of Fukushima” (contained in the previous post).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Japan must make public health and safety its highest priority above any economic or business interests
  2. There must be regularly updated and communication emergency response plans for any radioactive emissions, and immediate public release of information related to any disaster
  3. An absolute imperative that Japan and the international community co-operate immediately to prevent as much as possible more radioactive releases from Fukushima
  4. That all schools and populations in proximity to nuclear facilities in Japan be provided with potassium iodide tablets with directions about their use in the event of another nuclear emergency
  5. Urgent consideration should be given to evacuate populations, particularly children and women of childbearing age living in radiation zones greater than 1 milliseivert/year
  6. Currently about 1,800 square km, including substantial areas of the cities of Fukushima and Koriyama, are so contaminated that over 600,000 people will and are being exposed to 5 milliseiverts per year, and people are actively being encouraged by the government to return to areas emitting 20 milliseiverts per year. This is medically extremely irresponsible.
  7. Parts of Tokyo, Tochigi, Miyagi, Gunma, Chiba, Nagano, Yamagata and Niigata prefectures have also been contaminated but government programs responding to the nuclear disaster are artificially confined only to the Fukushima prefecture
  8. That expenses for relocation and accommodation be provided by the Japanese government
  9. That a population register must be established for all people that have been exposed to radiation, and they must be monitored for the rest of their lives for all types of cancer, particularly thyroid cancer and leukemia, congenital abnormalities, birth outcomes, diabetes and other diseases related to radiation
  10. Comprehensive detailed mapping of estimated total radiation exposures (Both external and internal – by whole body monitors) for all people living in affected areas. This has not yet been done by the government.
  11. All food grown in affected areas plus fish and seaweed must be continually tested for specific isotopes and labeled accordingly. Radioactively contaminated food must not be sold or eaten.
  12. Children must not be fed any radioactive food
  13. The government plan for Fukushima farmers to start growing food must be immediately ceased
  14. Comprehensive long term health screening for all diseases related to radiation exposure for everyone living in radiation areas emitting more than I milliseivert per year and mental health services be provided for all evacuees and residents
  15. Health monitoring plans and results must be independently monitored and peer reviewed and published as quickly as possible in Japanese and English
  16. That all people within the exposed population must be informed of their health information, particularly mothers who are desperately in need of  information about what radiation exposure could do to their children and what symptoms to look for
  17. A cancer registry must be initiated in all Japanese prefectures – in 2012 only 10 of Japan’s 47 prefectures had cancer registries
  18. Treatment for all radiation related diseases must be provided free of charge by the government
  19. All educational material issued by the nuclear industry to schools must be removed immediately and students must be taught the true facts about the medical consequences of nuclear power and radiation exposure and internal emitters, including cancer, congenital abnormalities and genetic diseases
  20.  Already at least 24,000 workers have participated in the Fukushima disaster remediation, and it is expected that tens of thousands more will be needed over the coming decades. These people have not been adequately monitored or followed up medically. They urgently require adequate radiation protection and monitoring, and ongoing health care for the rest of their lives.
  21. A national registry for all nuclear workers must be established as it is in other countries which must include utility employees and subcontractors, and workers must have ready access to all their results. There have been cover-ups related to worker exposure and this must not be allowed to occur. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/japan-earthquake-and-tsunami-in/9084151/How-the-Yakuza-went-nuclear.html
  22. That, beginning with the oldest first, all nuclear reactors, including reprocessing facilities and fast reactors be permanently shut down, as most have been for the last two years.

 

End

These recommendations, formulated by Helen Caldicott, have been derived from the following sources:

From a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Fukushima, Rapporteur Anand Grover, on Fukushima: The report by UN special rapporteur Anand Grover

and from the Statement by the International Physicians Board of Directors on the ongoing nuclear disaster in Japan related to the Report by the UN Special Rapporteur: Statement by IPPNW Board of Directors

Fukushima nuclear disaster is far from over

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health to the UN Human Rights Council